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Abstract 
Is real investment fully determined by fundamentals or is it sometimes affected by stock 
market misvaluation?  We introduce three new tests that: measure the reaction of investment 
to sales shocks for firms that may be overvalued; use Fama-MacBeth regressions to 
determine whether "overinvestment" affects subsequent returns; and analyze the time path 
of the marginal product of capital in reaction to fundamental and misvaluation shocks. 
Besides these qualitative tests, we introduce a measure of misvaluation into standard 
investment equations to estimate the quantitative effect of misvaluation on investment.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that both fundamental and misvaluation shocks affect 
investment. 
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"Perhaps the crucial, and relatively neglected, issues have to do with real 
consequences of financial markets.  ... Does market inefficiency have real 
consequences, or does it just lead to the redistribution of wealth from noise 
traders to arbitragers and firms?" 
Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, p. 178 
1 Introduction 
Some observers believe that the 2001 U.S. recession was the culmination of a stock market 
bubble that led to unusually high levels of business fixed investment in the late 1990s 
(especially in the sectors of the economy that were most affected by the bubble) and the 
collapse of investment as some firms attempted to reverse bubble-induced excesses. If 
correct, this account has important implications for macroeconomic theory and policy. In fact, 
there has been a lively debate about the appropriate monetary policy response to a possible 
bubble and, more generally, the role of asset prices in policy formulation.1 In this paper, we 
examine whether business fixed investment is determined solely by fundamentals or whether 
stock market misvaluation sometimes affects investment.  
For most economists, some skepticism seems appropriate about the idea that misvaluation 
led first to overinvestment and then a recession. Before the late 1990s, many economists 
doubted that stock prices deviated much from fundamentals. Even if one is now prepared to 
concede that the shares of firms may sometimes be misvalued, it is far from obvious that this 
will have any meaningful effect on real investment.  
Our prior – probably shared by most economists – is that fundamentals play a large role in 
determining investment. The role of misvaluation is less clearly established. At the level of 
basic economic theory, even if managers believe that their firms' shares are overvalued, they 
could issue shares and invest the proceeds in cash or fairly priced securities (such as T-bills) 
without increasing real investment. We refer to this as the "passive financing mechanism." On 
the other hand, overvaluation may suggest a low cost of equity finance. If managers perceive 
the cost of capital as low, they may proceed with investment projects that would have 
negative net present value in the absence of overvaluation. We refer to this as the "active 
financing mechanism." The passive financing mechanism implies that misvaluation does not 
affect investment, while the active financing mechanism implies that misvaluation does affect 
investment.2 
                                                     
1 For example, see Bean (2004), Bernanke (2003), Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Borio and White (2003), Cecchetti 
(2006), Dupor (2002, 2005), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Hunter, Kaufman, and Pomerleano (2003), and references 
cited therein for a discussion of these monetary policy issues. 
2 The [0] link between overvaluation and investment has been discussed by Keynes (1936), Bosworth (1975), Fischer 
and Merton (1984), Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1994), Chirinko and Schaller (1996, 2001), and Stein (1996), among 
others. 
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The debate concerning the relevance of passive vs. active financing remains unsettled in 
theoretical models. Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1990) argue for the passive financing mechanism, suggesting that firms should engage in 
financial arbitrage without letting misvaluation affect investment. In contrast, in the De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1989) model, firms must precommit to their investment 
plans, and it is rational for managers to let misvaluation influence investment. Stein (1996), 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) and Polk and 
Sapienza (2006) all provide models in which rational managers increase investment in 
response to overvaluation of their firm's shares. Panageas (2005a, 2005b) develops a model 
in which the response of investment to overvaluation depends on investors’ horizons and 
ownership stakes. Given this diversity of views, even if one is prepared to concede that firms 
are sometimes misvalued, economic theory does not provide a definitive answer on whether 
overvalued firms will overinvest. Empirical evidence is required. 
The existing empirical evidence is also mixed. Some papers have found evidence that 
misvaluation affects investment, while others have not.3 This suggests that power may be an 
important issue. Through much of the paper, we therefore focus on the set of firms that are 
the most likely to be misvalued. If we fail to find evidence of the effect of misvaluation on 
investment among these firms, we are unlikely to find it anywhere. 
The set of firms we focus on are glamour firms, which have been defined as firms with high 
stock market prices relative to an accounting-based measure of firm worth. In contrast, value 
firms have been defined as firms with relatively low stock market prices. Value firms 
substantially outperform glamour firms, with 8-10 % higher annual returns averaged over the 
five years subsequent to portfolio formation. A leading interpretation is that investor sentiment 
affects stock market prices and glamour portfolios include many temporarily overvalued firms. 
An alternative explanation is that the risk characteristics of glamour and value portfolios 
differ.4 The possibility that risk explains differences in returns between glamour firms and 
other portfolios will feature in our tests. 
According to both the active financing and passive financing stories, overvalued firms should 
issue equity. Do glamour firms issue shares? Using a large, unbalanced panel data set of 
almost 100,000 observations of U.S. firms over the period 1980-2001, we find that the median 
glamour firm issues enough new shares to finance 75 % of its annual investment spending. In 
contrast, the median value firm issues no shares. 
If the active financing story applies to at least some firms, the investment of glamour firms 
should be relatively high. Based on the same panel data, we find that glamour firms invest 
more than twice as much as value firms. Using two other basic benchmarks – one based on 
the corporate finance literature, the other on the macroeconomic investment literature – we 
again find that the investment of glamour firms is relatively high. 
                                                     
3 We review the empirical evidence in more detail in Section 7. 
4 See, for example, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003). 
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While the data on equity issuance and investment do not directly contradict the idea that 
misvaluation exists and affects real investment, we do not believe that they provide 
compelling evidence. Glamour firms might simply be firms that have received favorable 
fundamental shocks. These shocks would raise the firms' marginal Q, increase their 
investment, and perhaps induce them to issue new shares to finance their increased 
investment spending. 
The first main contribution of this paper is to introduce three new tests that are designed to 
determine whether investment is fully determined by fundamentals or whether misvaluation 
sometimes affects investment.  
First, some models suggest agents have extrapolative expectations. In these models, agents 
may overreact to a sequence of positive or negative shocks. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) propose this mechanism as a possible explanation for the difference in returns 
between glamour and value firms. If some investors have extrapolative expectations and if the 
financing mechanism is active, then glamour firms will tend to overreact to a sales shock. By 
estimating VARs and plotting the associated impulse response functions, we find that the 
investment of glamour firms responds strongly to sales shocks. We use a bootstrapping 
procedure to test whether the magnitude of the glamour firms’ reaction can be accounted for 
by fundamentals. 
Second, we examine stock market returns. Under the efficient markets hypothesis, 
information available last year should have no affect on stock market returns in future years. 
Even if there is misvaluation and returns are predictable to some extent, as long as 
misvaluation does not affect investment, a measure of “overinvestment” should have no 
significant predictive power for future returns. On the other hand, suppose a firm enters the 
glamour portfolio as the result of a misvaluation shock. If misvaluation influences investment 
decisions, the firm will tend to overinvest. Eventually, this excess investment will become 
apparent to investors, leading to lower stock market returns for overinvesting glamour firms. 
We test for the possible effect of “overinvestment” on the returns of glamour firms using 
Fama-MacBeth regressions. We find that a measure of overinvestment at the time of portfolio 
formation has significant predictive power for future excess returns. The economic magnitude 
is substantial: a one-standard-deviation increase in measured overinvestment reduces 
cumulative excess returns over the next five years by about 560 basis points per year.  
Third, we analyze how the time path of the marginal product of capital reacts to fundamental 
shocks and misvaluation shocks. A favorable fundamental shock increases a firm's stock 
price and shifts up its demand for capital (i.e., its marginal product of capital schedule). At the 
original capital stock, the marginal product of capital is higher. As the firm increases its capital 
stock in response to the shock, the marginal product of capital gradually declines. In contrast, 
if the active financing mechanism is operative, a misvaluation shock shifts down the capital 
supply curve (due to cheaper equity financing). The marginal product of capital declines 
around the time of portfolio formation (as firms increase their capital stock to equate the 
marginal product of capital to the lower cost of capital) and later rises as the misvaluation 
gradually dissipates. In the data, the marginal product of capital for glamour firms follows such 
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an "elongated U" pattern, falling around the time of portfolio formation and then gradually 
rising back to its pre-shock level. We use two additional approaches in an effort to draw out 
the respective roles of fundamental and misvaluation shocks. 
While the above qualitative evidence is suggestive of some role for misvaluation, it does not 
address the question of how large an effect misvaluation has on investment. An additional 
contribution of the paper is to directly estimate the effect of misvaluation on investment. We 
present parametric estimates based on four standard investment specifications – a generic 
investment specification, the neoclassical model, the flexible accelerator model, and the Q 
model. Coefficient estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in misvaluation 
raises investment by more than 30 %. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides summary 
statistics for the full sample. Section 3 discusses the mechanics of the passive and active 
financing mechanisms and presents data on new share issues by portfolio. In addition, 
Section 3 examines whether glamour firms’ investment is high or low relative to some basic 
benchmarks. Section 4 explains the idea of extrapolative expectations and presents the 
“overreaction test,” the test based on the response of the glamour portfolio to a sales shock. 
Section 5 presents Fama-MacBeth tests of the effect of a measure of “overinvestment” on 
future returns. Section 6 tests the time path of the marginal product of capital. Section 7 
presents quantitative estimates of the effect of misvaluation on investment. Section 8 
concludes and discusses the implications of the results.  
2 Data description 
The data is primarily drawn from CompuStat and CRSP. The sample period is 1980-2004. To 
minimize survivorship biases, we use unbalanced panel data. 
We measure whether a firm is a glamour or value firm in a given year using the price/sales 
ratio (i.e., the ratio of market value of equity to sales). The price/sales ratio has two key 
advantages: sales is a relatively straightforward accounting concept and is never negative.5 
Portfolios are formed by sorting all the firms for which the necessary data is available in a 
given year by the price/sales ratio. The two deciles with the highest stock market value 
(relative to sales) in a given year are classified as glamour firms. The next six deciles are 
classified as "typical" firms. The two deciles with the lowest stock market value (again, relative 
to sales) are classified as value firms. The portfolio formation procedure allows a firm to be a 
glamour firm this year, a typical firm next year, and a value firm the year after. In fact, it is 
common for firms to move from one portfolio to another. 
                                                     
5 Other valuation measures are problematic. Market/book (equity value/book value) is used in the literature, but it has 
many disadvantages noted by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, p. 1547). The equity value/cash flow ratio 
suffers from the frequent occurrence of negative values for cash flow and the resulting ambiguity. For example, 
negative cash flow might characterize a very young firm with excellent growth prospects but substantial current 
expenses or a mature firm whose current and future profitability is in doubt. 
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The primary variable we analyze is the ratio of investment (I) to the capital stock (K). The 
capital stock is calculated using a standard perpetual inventory algorithm.  
There are a few extreme outliers in the data. This is a common issue in panel data studies, 
resulting from mergers and other accounting changes. We use standard techniques to 
address the issue, specifically trimming the sample by deleting the 1 % tails of I/K, Sales/K, 
Cost/K, and real sales growth.  
Further details of data construction are provided in the Appendix. Summary statistics for 
several of the main variables are presented in Panel A of Table 1. 
3 Are glamour firms different? 
3a  Equity Finance 
If overvaluation exists, overvaluation may give the firm the impression that equity finance is 
cheap. In fact, some economists believe that firms time the market to take advantage of 
overvaluation.6 If this affects the firm's discount rate, some formerly negative NPV projects will 
become worthwhile. We refer to this as the active financing mechanism.7 
Under both the active and passive financing mechanisms, firms issue new shares to take 
advantage of overvaluation. Our next step is to check a necessary condition for both of these 
mechanisms – that glamour firms issue new shares. 
We normalize new share issues by investment spending. This allows us to readily address 
the following question: what percentage of capital expenditures in the current year is financed 
by new share issues? As shown in Panel B of Table 1, the median glamour firm raises about 
three-quarters of its investment standing from new share issues. In contrast, the median value 
firm does not raise any funds from equity markets. 
In the aggregate, glamour firms raise about 56 percent of their investment spending from new 
share issues. Value firms raise only 12 percent from new share issues. The difference is 
highly statistically significant; the t-statistic (based on 25 annual observations) is 6.23. 
3b  Real Investment 
The use of new share issues by glamour firms (documented in Table 1.B) is one of the two 
key elements of the active financing mechanism. The second element is investment 
                                                     
6 See, for example, Baker and Wurgler (2000) and the references cited therein. 
7 Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) investigate a related issue. Like us, they are interested in whether stock market 
misvaluation might affect real investment, but their focus is somewhat different. They look at firms that are dependent 
on equity because they do not have an alternative source of external finance. They find that the investment of equity-
dependent firms is more responsive to stock market Q. In contrast, our focus is on glamour firms; i.e., firms that may 
have alternative sources of finance but may perceive equity finance as cheap. 
  6
spending. If misvaluation has real effects, then, at a minimum, investment spending by 
glamour firms must be relatively high. This subsection presents three basic benchmarks for 
evaluating whether glamour firms’ investment is relatively high. 
Value firms provide one basic benchmark, since it is unlikely that value firms are overvalued. 
The first row of Table 2 compares the investment of glamour and value firms. The mean 
investment/capital (I/K) ratio for glamour firms is 0.299. This is more than twice as large as 
the mean for value firms of 0.121, and the difference is highly significant. 
The corporate finance literature provides a second benchmark. One explanation for the 
difference in returns between glamour and value firms in that literature involves differences in 
the industries which comprise the two portfolios. We therefore define the comparable firms 
benchmark for a given firm as the mean of I/K for firms in the same industry in the same year. 
The comparable firms benchmark is forward-looking to the extent that the investment of 
comparable firms is based on expectations of future discount rates and the expected future 
stream of marginal products of capital. 
For each firm in the glamour portfolio in a given year, we calculate the mean of I/K for firms in 
the same industry in the same year. The comparable firms portfolio substitutes this mean for 
the value of I/K for each firm in the glamour portfolio in each year, so the comparable firms 
benchmark reflects the industrial composition of the glamour portfolio as it evolves over time. 
The mean I/K ratio for the comparable firms benchmark is 0.205, which is about one-third 
lower than the mean for the glamour portfolio. 
Our third benchmark is based on the macroeconomic investment literature. Abel and 
Blanchard (1986) present a method of constructing marginal Q that does not depend on the 
stock market.8 The Abel and Blanchard technique is well suited to our situation because we 
require a measure of investment opportunities that takes into account rational expectations of 
the future but is not contaminated by potential stock market misvaluations. 
Originally applied to aggregate data, the Abel and Blanchard technique was extended to 
panel data by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). In their implementation, Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995) assume a constant discount rate. Risk is a leading explanation for the 
difference in returns between glamour and value portfolios, so this is a potential problem 
because variation in risk-adjusted interest rates might account for differences in investment 
between glamour and value portfolios. We therefore extend the work of Abel and Blanchard 
(1986) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) so that it applies to panel data and allows for 
variation in discount rates, both over time and across industries. In particular, we account for 
systematic risk in constructing marginal Q.9 
                                                     
8 Marginal Q is the expected present value of future marginal products of capital. 
9 The appendix provides details of how we construct marginal Q and the marginal Q benchmark. 
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The marginal Q benchmark for investment is constructed as follows. For all observations 
where the required data are available, we regress I/K on marginal Q. The marginal Q portfolio 
substitutes the predicted value of I/K from this regression for the value of I/K for each firm in 
the glamour portfolio (where the necessary data is available) in each year. The mean I/K ratio 
for the marginal Q benchmark is 0.166, which is about 40 % lower than the mean for the 
glamour portfolio.10 
4 Overreaction? 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) suggest that misvaluation is driven by extrapolative 
errors on the part of investors. In particular, based on evidence from the psychology literature, 
they argue that agents tend to see patterns where none exist. For example, a series of 
positive shocks to sales may give investors the illusion that a firm has moved into a new, 
higher sales growth regime that will persist for some time. 
The possibility of extrapolative errors leads to a test of the real effects of misvaluation. If firms 
enter the glamour portfolio because investors make extrapolative errors and if there is an 
active financing mechanism at work, then the response of investment to sales will be stronger 
for glamour firms than it would be if only fundamentals determined investment. Why? If 
investors make extrapolative errors, a positive sales shock will have two effects. First, since 
sales shocks are likely to contain some information about future marginal products of capital, 
a positive sales shock will increase Q (and thus investment). This is the conventional effect. 
Second, a positive sales shock will cause those with extrapolative expectations to unduly 
increase their estimate of the firm’s value. If there is an active financing mechanism at work, 
the sales shock will thus lead to a larger increase in investment than if investment were fully 
determined by fundamentals. The “overreaction test” is especially appealing because it is 
closely linked to the Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) model.  
We implement the overreaction tests by estimating a bivariate VAR of Sales/K and I/K using 
two lags. Sales is ordered first in the VAR. Under the assumption that the only shocks are to 
fundamentals, firms base their investment on fundamental shocks that are reflected in sales 
shocks. Value firms provide a natural point of reference in evaluating the response of glamour 
firms to a sales shock, since value firms are unlikely to be overvalued. We estimate the VAR 
for glamour and value firms separately and examine the difference in the impulse response 
functions.11 In estimating the VAR, we are careful to include the necessary lagged values of 
                                                     
10 The number of observations is smaller for the marginal Q benchmark because the data are not available to 
calculate marginal Q for all glamour observations. As a result, the mean of I/K for the glamour portfolio is slightly 
different in the row with the marginal Q benchmark than for the two previous rows of the table. 
11 Gilchrist, Himmelburg, and Hubermann (2005) also estimate firm-level VARs to evaluate the effect of misvaluation 
on investment. Their empirical work is aimed at finding a link between a measure of misvaluation (dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts) and investment in a single VAR. By contrast, our test, which offers complementary evidence, is 
based on two separate VARs estimated for sets of firms that differ in the likelihood of misvaluation and the differential 
response to a sales shock. 
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variables for a firm that is in the glamour portfolio in period t even though that firm may not 
have been in the glamour portfolio in t-1 or t-2. 
Figure 1 presents the impulse response functions for glamour and value firms. The 
investment of glamour firms responds more than twice as much as that of value firms to a 
one-standard-deviation sales shock. For glamour firms, the peak increase in I/K is about 0.07. 
For value firms, the peak increase in I/K is less than 0.03. 
The overreaction test is suggestive but not, in our view, fully persuasive. Glamour and value 
portfolios might differ in a variety of dimensions that could lead to different reactions to 
shocks, even if the only shocks are to fundamentals. Glamour firms might use different 
production technologies. Value firms might be riskier and face higher discount rates.  
To examine whether fundamentals can explain the magnitude of the glamour portfolio 
response to a sales shock, we adapt a technique from financial economics that is designed to 
control for risk but is also useful in controlling for production technology. The matching 
portfolios technique matches each firm in the portfolio of interest – in our case, the glamour 
portfolio – to a firm with similar characteristics (industry and size) and then forms a portfolio of 
matching firms.12 The difference between the matched portfolios and the glamour portfolio is 
that we strip potential misvaluation out of the matched portfolios. Our objective is that the 
matched portfolios will have the same fundamentals (i.e., industry and size) but little, if any, 
misvaluation. We use a bootstrapping procedure for inference, the details of which are 
provided in the appendix. Figure 1 confirms our skepticism that the magnitude of the glamour 
response to a sales shock (relative to the value response) is fully attributable to misvaluation 
and overreaction. The dashed line, labeled "bootstrapped fundamental," shows the median 
impulse response function of the bootstrapped matching portfolios. The peak of the 
bootstrapped fundamental response is about 50 % greater than the peak response of the 
value portfolio. This is consistent with the idea that part of the glamour response is accounted 
for fundamentals, such as production technology and risk. The dotted lines in Figure 1 provide 
the 95 % confidence interval for the bootstrapped fundamental impulse response function. 
The confidence intervals are sufficiently tight to allow us to reject the hypothesis that the 
difference between the peak response of the value and bootstrapped fundamental portfolios 
is due to sampling error. 
Fundamentals explain part of the response of the glamour portfolio to a sales shock, but they 
do not appear to explain all of the response. The peak response of the glamour portfolio is an 
increase of about 0.07 in I/K. The peak bootstrapped fundamental response is about one-third 
smaller. The confidence intervals are sufficiently tight to reject the null hypothesis that the 
peak response is the same for the glamour and bootstrapped fundamental portfolios.  
                                                     
12 Industry and size are both good measures of differences in production technology. The traditional measure of risk 
(CAPM beta) is often calculated by industry. Size is one of the factors in the Fama-French three-factor model of risk.  
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5 Returns 
Suppose, for the moment, that misvaluation exists and that a particular firm enters the 
glamour portfolio as the result of a misvaluation shock. If the active financing mechanism is 
operative for this firm (i.e., if misvaluation affects investment), the firm will tend to overinvest. 
Eventually, this excess investment will become apparent to investors, leading to low stock 
market returns in the future. 
In contrast, suppose there is no significant misvaluation. Under the efficient markets 
hypothesis, it is not possible to forecast future stock market returns based on current 
information. 
Now consider a third possibility. Suppose that misvaluation exists but has no significant effect 
on investment. If firms in the glamour portfolio tend to be overvalued, their returns may be 
predictably lower than those of other portfolios (such as the value portfolio).13  But, if 
misvaluation has no effect on investment, a purported measure of "overinvestment" should 
have no predictive power for future returns. 
We use a variant of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions to distinguish between the first 
scenario and the latter two scenarios. Specifically, we estimate regressions of the form: 
, , ,
h
pt t t p O G t pt pt ptret O Gβγ γ β γ η= + + +  
where hptret  is the cumulative excess return for horizon h, pβ  is the CAPM β  for portfolio p, 
ptO  is the amount of "overinvestment" in the period of portfolio formation, ptG is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 for glamour portfolios and 0 for the remaining portfolios, ptη is the 
error term in the regression, and t and p index time and portfolio, respectively. 
"Overinvestment" is defined as the investment that is not accounted for by marginal Q. The 
horizon is defined such that, e.g., the two-year horizon refers to returns from the beginning of 
the first year after portfolio formation to the end of the second year after portfolio formation. 
Under the latter two scenarios described above, "overinvestment" should have no predictive 
power for returns, and ,O Gγ  should be zero. If misvaluation affects investment, ,O Gγ  should be 
negative.14 
In each year, we divide the firms into 25 portfolios based on quintiles of the price/sales ratio 
and "overinvestment." We then calculate mean "overinvestment" for each portfolio in the year 
of portfolio formation and the CAPM β  for each of the 25 portfolios. A cross-sectional 
                                                     
13 This is the behavioral finance interpretation of the difference in returns between glamour and value firms. 
14 Polk and Sapienza (2006) also use a returns test in this context, but the details are different. They focus on one 
period ahead returns, use six control variables (investment/assets ratio, Brainard-Tobin’s Q, cash flow/assets ratio, 
market capitalization, book equity/market equity ratio, and firm momentum) and two misvaluation variables 
(discretionary accruals and equity issues), and sort the sample by R&D intensity, share turnover, and the Kaplan-
Zingales measure of finance constraints. 
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regression is run for each year. The Fama-Macbeth procedure tests whether the mean of the 
estimated values of ,O Gγ  (over the years in the sample) is significantly different from 0.  
Table 3 presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth tests. The values of ,O Gγ  are negative and 
statistically significant at each horizon indicating that “overinvestment” has a significant effect 
on returns. To gauge economic importance, the final column of the table reports the effect on 
returns of a one-standard-deviation increase in “overinvestment.” The effect is substantial. At 
the two-year horizon, for example, a one-standard-deviation increase in “overinvestment” for 
glamour firms decreases returns by about 470 basis points per year. The effect is about the 
same at the three-year horizon and larger at the four-year horizon (about 600 basis points) 
and five-year horizon (about 610 basis points). 
The results in Table 3 are consistent with evidence from the corporate finance literature. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that returns are substantially lower for the five years following 
a seasoned equity offering. Since the active financing mechanism involves equity issuance 
(and since glamour firms are heavy issuers of new shares, as shown in Table 1, Panel B), 
part of the explanation for the low returns Loughran and Ritter document could be that some 
overvalued firms overinvest. 
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) find that substantial increases in investment are associated with 
low returns over the next five years. They suggest corporate governance problems, 
specifically empire building by managers, as an explanation for these low returns. The 
corporate governance explanation is consistent with some other evidence. For example, 
Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) find that firms that receive cash windfalls 
tend to increase investment more than can be justified by either their investment opportunities 
or the relaxation of finance constraints. Using a revealed preference approach, Chirinko and 
Schaller (2004) find that the firms that are the most likely to suffer from managerial agency 
problems (firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities) use risk-adjusted 
discount rates that are 300-400 basis points lower than other firms in discounting the cash 
flows from investment projects.  
We do additional work in an effort to determine whether the results in Table 3 reflect 
corporate governance problems, misvaluation that leads to overinvestment by some firms, or 
both. We begin by estimating the following specification: 
, ,
h
pt t t p IRP t pt ptret IRPβγ γ β γ η= + + +  
where ptIRP  is “investment relative to the past” (the key variable in the Titman, Wei, and Xie 
study). “Investment relative to the past” is defined as I/K in the year of portfolio formation 
divided by the sum of I/K over the three years before portfolio formation. The results are 
presented in the first and second columns of Table 4 and are consistent with the findings of 
Titman, Wei, and Xie. For firms in general, unusually high investment (relative to the past) 
leads to low returns. 
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Next, we estimate a similar specification in which we differentiate between glamour and non-
glamour firms. To be precise, we estimate the following two regressions: 
, , ,
h
pt t t p IRP G t pt pt ptret IRP Gβγ γ β γ η= + + +  
, , ,
h
pt t t p IRP NG t pt pt ptret IRP NGβγ γ β γ η= + + +  
where ptNG is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for non-glamour portfolios and 0 for 
glamour portfolios. The results are reported in columns three through six of Table 4. For non-
glamour firms, the results are similar to those for firms in general. However, for glamour firms, 
high IRP is associated with high subsequent returns. This is a surprising result and one that 
seems inconsistent with a corporate governance interpretation. Instead, we suspect that 
some firms enter the glamour portfolio because they have been hit by favourable fundamental 
shocks that improve their investment opportunities. These firms are acting in the interests of 
their shareholders when they increase their investment relative to the past. If a manager has 
no way of credibly communicating the full improvement in investment opportunities, the firm’s 
stock market price will not fully respond at the time of the shock. Instead, subsequent returns 
will be high as the favourable fundamental shock gradually translates into strong performance 
and the firm’s high investment proves to be justified.  
The regression results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that “overinvestment” captures very different 
economic behaviour for glamour firms than investment relative to the past. Conceptually, 
overinvestment is not the same as high investment relative to the past. In situations where 
there has been no favourable fundamental shock to the firm, the two measures may both 
capture excessive investment. But in situations where some firms have received favourable 
fundamental shocks, the two variables will diverge. In the data, the correlation between the 
IRPpt and Opt is positive but much less than 1 (about 0.35).   
As a further check, we enter OptGpt and IRPpt Gpt in the same regression: 
, , , , ,
h
pt t t p O G t pt pt IRP G t pt pt ptret O G IRP Gβγ γ β γ γ η= + + + +  
As shown in Table 5, both variables are highly significant. As in the previous regressions, 
“overinvestment” has a strongly negative effect on the returns of glamour firms, while IRP has 
a strongly positive effect. The economic significance of IRP is about the same when both 
“overinvestment” and IRP are included in the regression as when only IRP is included. (In 
both specifications, a one-standard-deviation increase in IRP increases returns by about 800-
1000 basis points per year for glamour firms.) In contrast, when both variables are included in 
the regression, the estimated effect of “overinvestment” roughly doubles. When only 
“overinvestment” is included, the estimated effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in 
“overinvestment” is a decrease of about 500-600 basis points per year for glamour firms. 
When both “overinvestment” and IRP are included, the estimated effect of “overinvestment” is 
a decrease in returns of about 1000-1100 basis points per year for glamour firms.  
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The Fama-MacBeth tests provide evidence that both fundamental shocks and misvaluation 
shocks play a role in explaining the investment and returns behaviour of glamour firms. Some 
firms seem to enter the glamour portfolio as a result of favorable fundamental shocks. Some 
of these firms increase their investment relative to the past and enjoy high subsequent returns 
as the favorable fundamental shock and increased investment translate into better 
performance that is eventually perceived by investors. In contrast, other firms seem to enter 
the glamour portfolio because of misvaluation shocks. Some of these firms overinvest. When 
they overinvest, they act against the interests of their shareholders, and this is eventually 
reflected in low subsequent stock market returns.  
6 The time path of the marginal product of capital 
Misvaluation shocks and fundamental shocks have different implications for the time path of 
the marginal product of capital. As illustrated on the left-hand side of Figure 2, a favorable 
fundamental shock shifts out the firm’s demand for capital as measured by the marginal 
product of capital schedule. At the existing capital stock (K0), the marginal product of capital 
(MPK) rises. In the steady state, the marginal product of capital equals the user cost of capital 
(r in the figure). In order to restore this equality, the firm increases its capital stock, causing 
the marginal product of capital to decline. In the presence of adjustment costs, this process 
will take several years, leading to a time path of gradually declining marginal products of 
capital in the wake of a favorable fundamental shock. Thus, fundamental shocks have a clear 
implication for the time path of the marginal product of capital, as illustrated in the graph on 
the right hand side of Figure 2. A favorable fundamental shock leads to an increasing 
marginal product of capital around the time of portfolio formation and a declining marginal 
product of capital in subsequent years. 
If a positive misvaluation shock affects the cost of equity financing, it will shift down the capital 
supply curve, as illustrated in Figure 3. If the user cost of capital (at least as perceived by 
managers) decreases, the firm will tend to increase its capital stock in an effort to equate the 
marginal product of capital to the new, lower cost of capital ( 1r ). Such increases in the capital 
stock cause the marginal product of capital to decline around the time of portfolio formation. 
As the misvaluation dissipates, the perceived cost of capital rises and the desired capital 
stock falls. As firms adjust their capital stock downward, the marginal product of capital rises. 
Thus misvaluation shocks also have a clear empirical implication for the time path of the 
marginal product of capital – exactly the opposite implication from fundamental shocks. A 
positive misvaluation shock leads to a decrease in the marginal product of capital around the 
time of portfolio formation and an increase in the marginal product of capital in subsequent 
years. 
Figure 4 plots the marginal product of capital for the glamour portfolio. The time path of the 
marginal product of capital corresponds more closely with misvaluation shocks than 
fundamental shocks. The marginal product of capital falls around the time of entry into the 
glamour portfolio and rises in subsequent years.  
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A caveat is in order. The discussion above focuses on realized fundamental shocks. If a firm 
anticipates a fundamental shock at some point in the future, it begins increasing its capital 
stock at the time the news of the future fundamental shock arrives. This increase in the capital 
stock reduces the firm's marginal product of capital. When the fundamental shock is realized, 
it increases the marginal product of capital. As the firm continues to increase its capital stock, 
the marginal product of capital again declines. Thus, an anticipated fundamental shock would 
lead the marginal product of capital to fall, then rise above its initial level, then fall again. (The 
second fall would be avoided if the firm fully adjusted its capital stock before the anticipated 
shock was realized, but this seems implausible in view of the widespread evidence on the 
sluggishness of the capital stock in adjusting to shocks.)  
The fall and subsequent rise of the marginal product of capital illustrated in Figure 4 bears 
some resemblance to an anticipated fundamental shock, but two features of the time path are 
at odds with an anticipated fundamental shock. First, the marginal product of capital should 
rise above its original level. There is no sign of this in Figure 4. Second, the marginal product 
of capital should decline when the shock is realized. Five years after entry into the portfolio, 
there is still no sign of this decline.  
The time path of the marginal product of capital for the glamour portfolio supports the idea 
that misvaluation exists and affects investment. But we have strong priors that fundamental 
shocks must play an important role. We use two additional approaches in an effort to draw out 
the respective roles of fundamental and misvaluation shocks. 
First, we note that there may be heterogeneity: some firms could be affected solely by 
fundamental shocks while other firms are substantially affected by misvaluation shocks. To 
assess the role of heterogeneity, we move to the individual firm level and classify the path of 
the marginal product of capital as corresponding to either a fundamental shock or a 
misvaluation shock. If the marginal product of capital rises from period -1 to period 0 and is 
less than or equal to the period 0 level in period +3, we classify the shock as fundamental. 
(Time "0" here refers to the year of portfolio formation. In Figure 4, this corresponds to the 
year the firm first enters the glamour portfolio.) If the marginal product of capital falls from -1 
to 0 and is greater than the 0 level at +3, we classify the shock as a misvaluation shock. All 
other time paths are counted as "not classifiable." We then tabulate the number of 
fundamental and misvaluation shocks as a percentage of all the classifiable shocks. The 
classifiable shocks are split nearly evenly between fundamental shocks (51 %) and 
misvaluation shocks (49 %). This suggests that both fundamental shocks and misvaluation 
shocks play a role in determining the investment of glamour firms. 
Second, we make use of bootstrapped matching portfolios, as we did earlier (in Section 4). 
The dashed line in Figure 4 shows the marginal product of capital for the bootstrapped 
fundamental portfolio. At time 0 (the year of portfolio formation), the marginal product of 
capital of the bootstrapped fundamental portfolio rises, the response to a favorable 
fundamental shock predicted by economic theory. Again, as economic theory predicts in the 
case of a realized fundamental shock, the marginal product of capital declines after the shock, 
gradually returning to its pre-shock level. This provides empirical evidence that confirms the 
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predictions of economic theory regarding the effects of a fundamental shock and suggests 
that realized fundamental shocks play an important role for firms that are similar to those in 
the glamour portfolio (except for the fact that they do not have such high stock market prices). 
As shown by the dark line in Figure 4, the marginal product of capital for the glamour portfolio 
behaves in the opposite way, dropping relatively sharply at time 0 and then gradually rising 
back to its pre-shock level. The dotted lines in Figure 4 show the 95 % confidence interval for 
the bootstrapped fundamental path. At time 0, the marginal product of capital for the glamour 
portfolio moves well outside the confidence interval and it remains outside the confidence 
interval until three years after the shock. Together with the evidence on the proportion of 
fundamental and misvaluation shocks, the results in Figure 4 suggest that firms enter the 
glamour portfolio due to both fundamental and misvaluation shocks and that this is reflected 
in the investment behavior of the firms and resulting path of their marginal products of capital. 
Neither fundamental shocks nor misvaluation shocks can be ignored if we want to understand 
the economic behavior of these firms. 
7 How large an effect does misvaluation have on 
investment? 
The evidence in preceding sections is qualitative in nature. In this section, we provide 
quantitative estimates of the effect of misvaluation on investment.  In order to do this, we must 
construct a measure of misvaluation. The measure of misvaluation is stock market Q minus 
marginal Q (both measured at the beginning of the period). Stock market Q is the market 
value of the firm’s shares divided by the replacement cost of the firm’s capital stock. Details 
are provided in the Appendix.  
A number of earlier empirical studies have examined the relationship between stock market 
misvaluation and investment. Using aggregate US data, Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers 
(1993) find that stock market Q has a significant effect on investment after using a simple 
control for fundamentals, but they conclude that non-fundamentals have little effect on 
investment. Also using US aggregate data, Chirinko and Schaller (1996) find no evidence that 
misvaluation affects investment. In contrast, Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1994) find that non-
fundamentals have a significant effect on investment, and Chirinko and Schaller (2001) obtain 
qualitatively similar results using aggregate Japanese data. Using firm-level US data, Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that movements in relative share prices are associated with 
statistically significant investment changes, but they conclude that misvaluation has a minor 
impact on investment because of low incremental 2R s. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) find 
that the investment of equity-dependent firms is relatively more sensitive to stock market Q. 
Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) find that shocks to dispersion in analysts' 
forecasts (a proxy for misvaluation) affect investment. Polk and Sapienza (2006) find that 
various proxies for misvaluation affect investment after controlling for, among other variables, 
stock market Q (their proxy for fundamentals). On the other hand, Bond and Cummins (2001), 
after controlling for fundamentals using analysts' forecasts, find a statistically weak effect of 
stock market Q, and Bakke and Whited (2006), using a measurement-error-consistent 
estimator to separate fundamentals and non-fundamentals, find that the non-fundamental 
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information in stock prices only influences small firms that have low levels of market 
mispricing and rely on equity finance. 
In standard models of investment, key variables in the determination of investment are the 
interest rate, the relative price of investment goods, and output. In Table 6, we present a 
generic investment specification in which I/K is regressed on misvaluation and the lagged 
percentage changes in real sales, the relative price of investment goods, and the interest rate 
for the full sample of observations for which all the necessary data are available.15  
The coefficient on misvaluation in the generic investment specification is positive and highly 
significant (with a t-statistic of 46). The coefficient estimate of 0.0032 implies that a one-
standard-deviation increase in misvaluation increases I/K by 0.039 (about 37 % of the median 
I/K of 0.104). 
Much recent research has suggested that investment is sensitive to cash flow, so in the 
second column of Table 6 we estimate a similar specification, this time including the ratio of 
cash flow to the capital stock.16 Including cash flow in the specification has little effect on the 
misvaluation coefficient.  
The neoclassical investment model [(Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1971), Eisner 
and Nadiri (1968)] suggests a specification in which investment is regressed on distributed 
lags of the percentage change in output and the user cost of capital. In Table 7, we add 
misvaluation to a neoclassical investment specification. The coefficient on misvaluation is 
smaller than the coefficient in the generic investment specification. The coefficient estimate of 
0.0027 implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in misvaluation increases I/K by 0.033 
(about 32 percent of the median I/K of 0.104). The effect of misvaluation is again highly 
significant, with a t-statistic of 37. Including cash flow in the specification has little effect on 
the misvaluation coefficient.  
The flexible accelerator model is similar to the neoclassical model except that the user cost of 
capital terms are omitted. As columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show, misvaluation also has an 
economically and statistically significant effect on investment in the flexible accelerator model.  
Finally, in Table 8, we estimate a Q model of investment. A conceptual advantage of the Q 
model is that Q, unlike the variables that appear in the generic, neoclassical, or flexible 
                                                     
15 The regression includes both fixed firm effects and time effects. The inclusion of fixed effects raises an econometric 
issue. Sufficiently high serial correlation of the errors may lead to biased estimates of the coefficient on the 
misvaluation term with fixed effects estimation. Since the residual serial correlation coefficient (about 0.25 in Tables 
6-8) is approximately equal to the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, we can use the simulation results of 
Judson and Owen (1999, Table 1) to evaluate coefficient bias. For T equal to five (about the average number of 
observations per firm in our sample), the bias in the coefficient on the regressor is less than 1 %. 
16 A leading interpretation is that cash flow enters due to finance constraints, as suggested by Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen (1988). This interpretation has been contested by Abel and Eberly (2003), Gomes (2001), and Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997, 2000). See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000) for a reply to the Kaplan and Zingales critique 
and Hubbard (1998) and Schiantarelli (1995) for surveys. 
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accelerator specifications, is explicitly forward-looking. A potential problem with the Q model 
is that stock market Q will be affected by any misvaluation in the stock market. To avoid this 
problem, we use marginal Q in the regression. Like stock market Q, marginal Q reflects 
expectations of future discount rates and the future stream of marginal products of capital.  
The coefficient on misvaluation in the Q specification is close to the estimated coefficient in 
the generic investment specification. The estimated coefficient on misvaluation is 0.0031. This 
implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in misvaluation raises I/K by 0.038 – slightly 
more than 35 %, relative to the sample median of I/K. Again, the estimated effect of 
misvaluation is highly significant, with a t-statistic of 45. Specifications including and excluding 
cash flow are presented in the table; the coefficient estimates and t-statistics for misvaluation 
are similar, irrespective of whether or not cash flow is included in the specification. 
The parametric estimates in Tables 6 to 8 indicate misvaluation has a quantitatively large 
effect on investment, with a one standard deviation increase in misvaluation leading to a 30 % 
or so increase in investment. The effects in Tables 6 to 8 are more striking – both statistically 
and economically – then those found in many previous studies. There are at least three 
potential explanations. First, we directly estimate the effect of misvaluation. Some previous 
studies have used indirect approaches such as orthogonality tests (e.g., Chirinko and Schaller 
(1996)) or plausible proxies for misvaluation. (See the studies discussed earlier in this 
section.) Second, the measures of fundamentals (marginal Q) and misvaluation (which is 
based on marginal Q) have strong foundations in investment theory and are constructed with 
careful attention to issues like discount rate variation, risk, and information sets. Sharper 
measures of fundamentals and misvaluation should lead to sharper empirical estimates. 
Third, the coverage of firms in this paper is considerably more extensive than in previous 
studies, including many newer (and more short-lived) firms for which misvaluation (and its 
effect on investment) may be relatively important. 
8 Conclusion and Implications 
In this paper, we introduce three new tests designed to evaluate whether investment is fully 
determined by fundamentals or whether stock market misvaluation plays some role. We look 
carefully for the effect of both fundamental and misvaluation shocks and find considerable 
evidence that fundamental shocks play an important role in determining the investment of 
glamour firms. However, none of the three new tests – overreaction, returns, and marginal 
product of capital – yields evidence that is consistent with the null hypothesis that investment 
is fully determined by fundamentals.  
In Section 7, we estimate the quantitative effect of misvaluation on investment using standard 
investment equations. We estimate four types of investment equations – neoclassical, 
accelerator, Q, and a generic specification (which includes the key variables that are believed 
to determine investment). Consistent with the evidence in Sections 4-6, the fundamental 
variables (such as user cost and marginal Q) have a highly significant effect on investment. 
The effect of misvaluation on investment is also statistically significant. As a measure of 
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economic significance, the estimated coefficients imply that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in misvaluation increases investment by about 30 % relative to the median level of 
investment in the sample. The estimated effect of misvaluation is robust across the four types 
of investment equations. 
There are important policy implications of evidence that misvaluation has real consequences. 
Central banks may need to pay some attention to possible stock market misvaluation. 
Misvaluation shocks affect asset prices but may have relatively little impact on broad 
measures of inflation. If misvaluation shocks can lead to overinvestment and subsequent, 
possibly dramatic, retrenchment, central banks may need to move beyond Taylor rules (which 
treat inflation and unemployment as the only legitimate inputs for monetary policy rules). 
Tax policy may also have a role to play if misvaluation distorts the efficient allocation of 
capital. Both informal accounts and the most sophisticated recent asset pricing models 
suggest that the prospect of capital gains plays a key role in driving misvaluation. Agents buy 
assets not for their intrinsic value but because they believe that they will be able to resell the 
asset at a still higher price to some other agent. (See, e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).) 
Stiglitz (2003) argues that a relatively simple way to defuse this sort of misvaluation is by 
increasing the capital gains tax rate and thus reducing the speculative motive for asset 
acquisition.17 
Simply recognizing the possibility of misvaluation – and that misvaluation can have real 
consequences – might conceivably lead to more prudent fiscal decisions. Projections of tax 
revenues based on periods of significant misvaluation (and the associated increase in real 
activity) may be misleading, resulting in subsequent fiscal imbalances. 
Recognizing the possibility that overvaluation may lead to overinvestment also opens up 
interesting research questions. How much distortion in capital allocation results from 
misvaluation? Are there institutional changes that would make misvaluation less likely? Are 
there institutional or policy changes that could decrease the misallocation of capital induced 
by misvaluation? One example of such an institutional change would be greater transparency, 
perhaps through reform of accounting procedures. Blanchard and Watson (1982) argue that 
misvaluation is more likely when agents do not know economic fundamentals. Another 
example flows from the evidence in this paper that the active financing mechanism plays an 
important role. This suggests that it might be helpful to reduce the conflicts of interest that 
tempt financial intermediaries to misleadingly promote securities. 
There are also implications for how we understand the economics of growth, financial 
markets, and economic fluctuations. Cochrane (1994) argues that is hard to account for 
macroeconomic fluctuations with conventional demand and technology shocks. The evidence 
presented in this paper suggests that misvaluation shocks have an effect on real variables. 
                                                     
17 Schaller and Zhang (2005) analyze this more formally by introducing capital gains taxation into the Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003) model and assessing the effect of changes in the capital gains tax rate on the magnitude of 
misvaluation. 
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Can misvaluation shocks help to account for aggregate fluctuations? Are there other channels 
through which misvaluation shocks significantly affect real variables (e.g., stock price or 
housing price misvaluations affecting consumption, commercial property misvaluations 
affecting investment)? Have misvaluation shocks played a significant role in noteworthy 
macroeconomic episodes, such as the late 1980s boom in Japan and the subsequent decade 
of stagnation or the Great Depression? 
A very large question is whether overvaluation can sometimes play a positive role in fostering 
economic growth. Jermann and Quadrini (2003), for example, provide a model in which small 
firms are finance constrained.18 Overvaluation lowers the cost of finance and relaxes finance 
constraints for these firms, leading to more investment and the reallocation of capital and 
labor to constrained firms. The result is an increase in productivity. Much earlier, in a 
discussion of the 1920s, Keynes (1931) expressed similar sentiments: "While some part of 
the investment which was going on ... was doubtless ill judged and unfruitful, there can, I 
think, be no doubt that the world was enormously enriched by the constructions of the 
quinquennium from 1925 to 1929." Can we measure the extent to which overvaluation 
reduces finance constraints? If we could, it might be possible to more carefully investigate 
possible trade-offs between the advantages of misvaluation (fostering growth) and the 
disadvantages (misallocation of capital, potential for a subsequent crash and resulting 
recession or depression). 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that these questions are relevant for 
developed economies with strong capital markets (such as the US). Arguably, they are even 
more important for developing economies with relatively weak capital markets. 
                                                     
18 See also Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2006). 
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10 Appendix 
This appendix details the construction of and data sources for several of the variables, stock 
portfolios, and statistics analyzed in the paper: glamour and value portfolios; capital stock and 
investment; the user cost of capital; the real risk-adjusted market discount rate; the marginal 
product of capital; misvaluation, stock market Q, and marginal Q; and the empirical bootstrap 
procedures for the overreaction and marginal product of capital tests. 
A.  Glamour and Value Portfolios 
We construct the glamour and value portfolios using the price/sales ratio. The price/sales ratio 
is Common Shares Outstanding (CompuStat item 25) times Price – Fiscal Year – Close 
(CompuStat item 199) divided by Net Sales (CompuStat item 12). Observations with missing 
or non-positive values for the price/sales ratio are dropped. Additionally, firms with a value of 
GPLANT less than $1 million are dropped, where GPLANT is gross property, plant, and 
equipment (CompuStat item 7), and the first observation for each firm is excluded. We then 
trim the sample, eliminating the 1 % most extreme observations in each tail for the following 
four variables: I/K, Sales/K, Cost/K, and real sales growth. Cost is equal to Cost of Goods 
Sold (CompuStat item 41) plus Selling, General, and Administrative Expense (CompuStat 
item 189). After trimming, the remaining observations for a given year are sorted into deciles 
by the price/sales ratio. The top two deciles are classified as glamour firms (i.e., firms with 
high stock market prices relative to sales). The bottom two deciles are classified as value 
firms (i.e., firms with low stock market prices relative to sales), and the remaining deciles are 
classified as typical firms. 
B.  Capital Stock and Investment 
For the first observation for firm f, the capital stock is based on the net plant (NPLANT), the 
nominal book value of net property, plant, and equipment (CompuStat item 8). To convert this 
to real terms, we divide by the sector-specific price index for investment (pI). Since book value 
is not adjusted for changes in the value of capital goods purchased in the past, we adjust the 
initial capital stock using the sector-specific ratio of nominal replacement cost to historical 
cost:  
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where K$ is the current-cost net stock of private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.1ES), 
KHIST is historical-cost net stock of private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.3ES), s is a 
sector index (for firm f’s sector), and 0
ft is the year of the first observation for firm f. 
For subsequent observations, a standard perpetual inventory method is used to construct the 
capital stock, 
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where δ is the depreciation rate (defined below) and I is gross investment, which is capital 
expenditures in the firm’s financial statements (CompuStat item 128). The firm reports capital 
expenditures in nominal terms, so we divide by pI to convert to real terms.19 
In some cases, there is a data gap for a particular firm. In this case, we treat the first new 
observation for that firm in the same way as we would if it were the initial observation. This 
avoids any potential sample selection bias that would result from dropping firms with gaps in 
their data. 
We construct sector-specific, time-varying depreciation rates using data from the BEA. 
Specifically,  
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where D$ is current-cost depreciation of private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.4ES), 
DQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of depreciation of private fixed assets by sector 
(BEA, Table 3.5ES), K$ is the current cost net stock of private fixed assets by sector (as 
defined above), and KQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of the net stock of private fixed 
assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.2ES). 
We construct the sector-specific price index for investment using BEA data:  
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=  (B4) 
where I$ is historical-cost investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.7ES) and 
IQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA, 
Table 3.8ES). 
The variables obtained from the BEA for constructing depreciation rates and price indices for 
investment are calculated for 2002, 2003, and 2004 by extending the corresponding 1950 to 
2001 data series, which are reported with a somewhat different classification scheme. (The 
data for 1950 to 2001 are on a SIC basis, while the data for 2002 to 2004 are on a NAICS 
basis.) This extension uses BEA data for 2002 through 2004 to calculate the percentage 
                                                     
19 The BEA tables beginning with a 3 cited in this Appendix contain data for private fixed assets, equal to the sum of 
nonresidential fixed assets (relevant for this study) and residential fixed assets. Residential fixed assets only enter 
the Real Estate and Farm industries. Since we exclude firms in the Real Estate industry and the number of firms in 
the Farm industry is tiny, data drawn from the BEA private fixed asset tables (those beginning with a 3) for this study 
pertain to nonresidential fixed assets. 
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change in a given variable between two years and then multiplies by the previous observation 
in the existing series to get the new value. For example, for 2002, the variable K$ is 
calculated for each industry as: 
 ,2002,2002 ,2001
,2001
$
$ $
$
MR
s
s s MR
s
K
K K
K
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (B5) 
where the superscript MR denotes the more recent version of the variable. The validity of this 
procedure was evaluated by comparing values estimated by the procedure represented in 
equation (B5) for 2001 with data on the prior classification for 2001. The relations among the 
SIC codes, BEA SIC industries, and BEA NAICS industries are detailed in the following 
correspondence table, 
SIC Codes BEA SIC Industries BEA NAICS Industries 
 Agriculture, forestry, & fishing Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
& hunting 
0100-0799   Farms   Farms 
0800-0999   Ag. services, forestry, & fishing        Forestry, fishing, & related activities 
   
 Mining Mining 
1000-1199   Metal mining   Mining (except oil & gas)  
  + Support activities for mining1 
1200-1299   Coal mining   Mining (except oil & gas)  
  + Support activities for mining1 
1300-1399   Oil & gas extraction   Oil & gas extraction 
1400-1499   Nonmetallic minerals, except  
  Fuels 
  Mining (except oil & gas)  
  + Support activities for mining1 
   
1500-1799 Construction Construction 
   
1800-1999 No Match To BEA SIC Industries  
   
 Manufacturing  
 Durable goods  
2400-2499   Lumber & wood products   Wood products 
2500-2599   Furniture & fixtures   Furniture & related products 
3200-3299   Stone, clay, & glass products   Nonmetallic mineral products 
3300-3399   Primary metals industries   Primary metals 
3400-3499   Fabricated metal products   Fabricated metal products 
3500-3599   Industrial mach. & equipment   Machinery 
3600-3699   Electronic & other electrical  
  Equipment 
  Electrical equipment, appliances, & 
  Components 
3711, 3714   Motor vehicles and equipment   Motor vehicles, bodies & trailers, & 
  Parts 
3700-37992   Other transportation equipment   Other transportation equipment 
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3800-3899   Instruments & related products   Computer & electronic products 
3900-3999   Miscellaneous mfg. industries   Miscellaneous manufacturing 
 Nondurable goods  
2000-2099   Food & kindered products   Food & beverage & tobacco prods. 
2100-2199   Tobacco products   Food & beverage & tobacco prods. 
2200-2299   Textile mill products   Textile mills & textile prod. mills 
2300-2399   Apparel & other textile prods.   Apparel & leather & allied prods. 
2600-2699   Paper & allied products   Paper products 
2700-2799   Printing & publishing   Printing & related support activities 
2800-2899   Chemicals & allied products   Chemical products 
2900-2999   Petroleum & coal products   Petroleum & coal products 
3000-3099   Rubber & misc. plastic prods.   Plastics & rubber products  
3100-3199   Leather & leather products   Apparel & leather & allied prods. 
   
 Transportation & public utils.  
4300-4399 No Match To BEA SIC Industries  
 Transportation  
4000-4099   Railroad transportation   Railroad transportation 
4100-4199   Local & interurban passenger  
  Transit 
  Transit & ground passenger  
  Transportation 
4200-4299   Trucking & warehousing   Truck transportation + Warehousing  
  & storage3 
4400-4499   Water transportation   Water transportation 
4500-4599   Transportation by air   Air transportation 
4600-4699   Pipelines, except natural gas   Pipeline transportation 
4700-4799   Transportation services   Other transportation & support  
  Activities 
   
4800-4899 Communications Publishing industries (including software) 
+ Broadcasting & telecommunications + 
Information & data processing services 
   
4900-4999 Electric, gas & sanitary services Utilities 
   
5000-5199 Wholesale trade Wholesale trade 
   
5200-5999 Retail trade Retail trade 
   
6000-6799 Finance, insurance, & real estate Finance & insurance + Real estate & 
rental & leasing 
   
6800-6999 No Match To BEA SIC Industries  
   
 Services  
7000-7099   Hotels & other lodgings   Accommodation 
7100-7199 No Match To BEA SIC Industries  
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7200-7299   Personal services Other services, except government 
7300-7399   Business services   Computer systems design & related  
  services and Miscellaneous  
  professional, scientific, &  
  technical services, + Management  
  of companies & enterprises +  
  Administrative & waste  
  management services4 
7400-7499 No Match To BEA SIC Industries  
7500-7599   Auto repair, services & parking Other services, except government 
7600-7699   Miscellaneous repair services Other services, except government 
7700-7799 No Match To BEA SIC Industries  
7800-7899   Motion pictures   Motion picture & sound recording  
  Industries 
7900-7999   Amusement & recreational svcs. Arts, entertainment, & recreation 
   
 Other services  
8000-8099   Health services Health care & social assistance 
8100-8199   Legal services   Legal services 
8200-8299   Educational services   Educational services  
8300-8999   Other Other services, except government 
   
Notes to the correspondence table: 
1. The indexes for KQUANT (BEA, Table 3.2ES), DQUANT (BEA, Table 3.5ES), and IQUANT (BEA, Table 3.8ES) 
can not be added together across NAICS categories.  The components are combined by taking a weighted-
average of the growth rates of the NAICS indexes. The weights used to allocate Mining (except oil & gas) + 
Support activities for mining are (66 %, 34 %) for KQUANT, (59 %, 41 %) for DQUANT, and (57 %, 43 %) for 
IQUANT. 
2. Excludes industries 3711 and 3714. 
3. See note 1. The weights used to allocate Truck transportation + Warehousing & storage are (73 %, 27 %) for 
KQUANT, (87 %, 13 %) for DQUANT, and (82 %, 18 %) for IQUANT. 
4. See note 1. The weights used to allocate Computer systems design & related services and Miscellaneous 
professional, scientific, & technical services (the indexes for Professional, scientific, and technical services are 
used for these computations), + Management of companies & enterprises + Administrative & waste management 
services are (34 %, 42 %, 24 %) for KQUANT, (54 %, 25 %, 21 %) for DQUANT, and (55 %, 24 %, 21 %) for 
IQUANT. 
 
C.  The User Cost of Capital 
The user cost of capital is calculated as follows 
 ,, , ,
,
1( )
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 (C1) 
where r is the real, risk-adjusted interest rate, z is the present value of depreciation 
allowances, u is the investment tax credit rate, τ  is the corporate tax rate, pI is the price of 
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investment goods, and pY is the price of output. C is expressed as an annual rate, so r and δ  
are both expressed as annual rates. Where variables are available at a monthly or quarterly 
frequency, we take the average for the calendar year. The corporate tax rate is the U.S. 
federal tax rate on corporate income. The present values of depreciation allowances for non-
residential equipment and structures were provided by Dale Jorgenson. (The data provided 
by Dale Jorgenson end in 2001; for 2002-04, we use 2001 values.) To calculate z, we took 
the weighted sum of Jorgenson's z’s for equipment and structures, where the weights are the 
share of equipment investment and the share of structures investment (for a given year) in 
nominal gross private nonresidential investment in fixed assets from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (from table 1IHI, where equipment investment is referred to as equipment and 
software). Because the investment tax credit applies only to equipment, u=0 for structures, we 
multiply the statutory ITC rate for each year by the ratio of equipment investment to the sum 
of structures and equipment investment for that year. The corporate tax rates were provided 
directly by the Treasury Department, and investment tax credit rates are drawn from 
Pechman (1987, p.160-161). For the years 1980 to 2001, the sector-specific price index for 
output, pY, is the implicit price deflator for Gross Domestic Product by industry produced by 
the BEA, normalized to 1 in 1996. For 2002 through 2004, the sector-specific price index is 
recursively extended forward by: 
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A
Y Y t
s t s t A
t
pp p
p
+
+
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (C2) 
where pA is the aggregate non-farm business price index for gross value added (BEA Table 
1.3.4). 
In Table 9, the cost of capital is divided into two components – the relative price of investment 
goods (including tax adjustments), defined as 
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and the real, risk-adjusted interest rate (including depreciation and the adjustment for the 
corporate income tax rate), 
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D.  The Real Risk-Adjusted Market Discount Rate 
The real, risk-adjusted market discount rate is defined as follows,  
 ,f tr   =  ((1+ ,
NOM
f tr ) / (1+
e
tπ )) - 1.0. (D1) 
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The equity risk premium is calculated using CAPM. The components of rf,t are defined and 
constructed as follows,  
,
NOM
f tr  = Nominal, short-term, risk-adjusted cost of capital 
 = λs (1-τt) 
,NOM DEBT
tr   +  (1-λs) 
,
,
NOM EQUITY
s tr . 
 
,NOM DEBT
tr  = Nominal corporate bond rate (Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate 
Bond Yield)  
,
,
NOM EQUITY
s tr  = Nominal, short-term, risk-adjusted cost of equity capital for firmsin sector 
s. 
 = ,NOM Ftr   +  σs. 
 
,NOM F
tr  = Nominal, one-year, risk-free rate (One-Year Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate) 
 
,
e
s tπ  = Sector-specific capital goods price inflation rate from t to t+1.  Sector-
specific data was not yet available for 2005 at the time of data 
construction, so ,
e
s tπ  for 2003 was also used for 2004. 
 
σs = Equity risk premium. 
 
τt = Marginal rate of corporate income taxation. 
 
λs = Sector-specific leverage ratio calculated as the mean of book debt for 
the sector divided by the mean of (book debt + book equity) for the 
sector. 
 
Under the CAPM,  
 
      σs  =  βs (μEQUITY- μF), (D2) 
where 
 
βs = CAPM β for sector s 
 
μEQUITY = Total return on equities from 1950-2004. The source is the value-
weighted CRSP index (including dividends).  
 
μF = Total return on risk-free Treasury bills from 1950-2004. The source is 
the FRED database, specifically the series for 1-Year Treasury 
Constant Maturity Rate. 
 
E.  The Marginal Product of Capital 
We assume that production possibilities are described by the following CES technology that 
depends on capital (Ki,t), labor (Li,t), and labor-augmenting technical progress (Ai,t) for firm i at 
time t, 
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{ }[((1 ) ) /( 1)][( 1) / ] [( 1) / ]i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,tY Y[K , L , A ] K (1 )(A L ) +η σ σ−σ− σ σ− σ= = ω + −ω (E
1) 
where ω is the share parameter, σ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
(this σ differs from the one defined in Section D as the equity risk premium), and η represents 
deviations from constant returns to scale. In order to allow for the effects of imperfect 
competition in the product market, we embed equation (E1) into the following revenue 
function, 
 i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
REV[K ,A L ] p[Y[K ,A L ]] Y[K ,A L ],=
 (E2) 
and assume that the inverse demand schedule, p[.], has a constant elasticity, 
 i,t i,t i,t(p '[Y ]Y / p[Y ] 1 0,μ ≡ − > μ≥  (E3) 
 
Differentiating equation (E3) with respect to capital, we obtain the following expression for the 
value marginal product of capital, which, with some violation of convention, we simply refer to 
as the marginal product of capital (MPK), 
 i,t i,tMPK[Y ,K : , , , ] ( REV / K) / pσ ω η μ ≡ ∂ ∂ , (E4) 
 [1/ ]i,t i,t i,t[Y / K ] Y
ζσ= Γ , (E5) 
                     (1 ) (1 )Γ ≡ −μ +η ω , (E6) 
                     [( ( 1)) /(1 ) ]ζ ≡ η σ− +η σ . (E7) 
As shown in equation (E5), the MPK depends on three separate elements:  
   i)  three parameters combined in Γ representing product market competition (μ), returns 
to scale (1+η), and the factor share of capital (ω);  
   ii)   the output/capital ratio raised to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution (σ); 
   iii) output raised to a power determined by a parameter (ζ) that reflects non-constant 
returns to scale and the substitution elasticity. Note that ζ = 0 if returns to scale are 
constant or the substitution elasticity is unity.  
The frequently used Cobb-Douglas production function is a special case of equation (E5). The 
Cobb-Douglas is defined by an elasticity of substitution of unity (σ = 1) and constant returns to 
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scale (η = 0). With either of these restrictions, the output term (elements iii)) disappears, and 
the output/capital ratio is no longer raised to a power. If we further assume that market power 
is absent in the product market (μ = 0), then the MPK for the Cobb-Douglas production 
function is written as follows, 
   i,t i,t i,t i,tMPK[Y ,K : 1, , 0, 0] [Y / K ]σ = ω η = μ = = ω .    (E8) 
In this case, the MPK is proportional to the output/capital ratio with the constant of 
proportionality equal to the capital share parameter.  
Equation (E5) assumes that three parameters – μ, η, and ω – are constant across all firms. 
This assumption seems restrictive. We allow these parameters to vary by sector and 
represent their product by Γj, where j denotes the sector in which firm i operates. Equation 
(E5) can be rewritten in terms of Γj, the output/capital ratio raised to [1/σ], and an additional 
output term that differs from unity whenever returns to scale are not constant (ηj ≠ 0) or the 
elasticity of substitution differs from unity (σ ≠ 1),  
   j[1/ ]i,t i,t j j j j i,t i,t i,tMPK[Y ,K : , , , ] [Y / K ] Y
ζσσ ω η μ = Γ ,   
 (E9a) 
   j j j j(1 ) (1 )Γ ≡ −μ +η ω ,     
 (E9b) 
   j j j[( ( 1)) /((1 ) )]ζ ≡ η σ− +η σ .     
 (E9c) 
In order to make equation (E9a) operational, two decisions need to be made concerning the 
unknown parameters. First, we will assume that σ equals 1.0. Second, following Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1998, Section 2.1), we estimate Γj by utilizing the long-run relation between 
MPK and the user cost of capital (UCi,t) for all firms in sector j. Specifically, we compute Γj for 
all firms in sector j (i ε I(j)) for all available time periods t (t ε T(j)) as follows, 
 i,t i,t
i I( j) t T( j) i I( j) t T( j)
MPK UC
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
=∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , (E10a) 
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where UCN  is the number of nonmissing observations over which the sum in the numerator 
of the right hand side of (E10c) is taken and YKN  is the number of nonmissing observations 
over which the sum in the denominator of the right hand side of (E10c) is taken. The MPK for 
firm i at time t equals equation (E9a) with the estimate of Γj given in equation (E10c).  
F.  Misvaluation, Stock Market Q, and Marginal Q  
Misvaluation (MV) is defined as the difference between stock market Q (QSM) and marginal Q 
(QM). 
Stock market Q is defined as the market value of common equity divided by the replacement 
cost of the capital stock. Common equity is defined as Common Shares Outstanding 
(CompuStat item 25) times Price – Fiscal Year – Close (CompuStat item 199). The 
replacement cost of capital is K, as described above. The nominal value of common equity is 
converted to real terms by dividing by pY.  
Define tλ  as the expected present value of future marginal products of capital, 
 ( )1−∞Σ Π jt - 1 j=0 t + s K,t+ jt K,t+ js=0 =          - CE R Fλ   (F1) 
where 1tE − is the expectations operator, conditional on the information set in period t-1, R is 
the discount factor, KF  is the marginal product of capital, narrowly defined, and KC is the 
derivative of the adjustment cost function with respect to the capital stock. Marginal Q is 
defined in the empirical work as /M I Yt t t tQ p pλ= − , where Ip  is the price of investment 
goods and Yp is the price of output. (For expositional simplicity, we focus onλ  in the 
equations below.) Define the marginal product of capital (broadly defined to include the 
marginal reduction in adjustment costs from an additional unit of capital) as, 
 ( )≡t K,t K,t   - CM F   (F2) 
We can then define the ex post present value of future marginal products of capital as: 
 ( )1−∞≡ Σ Π% jj=0 t+s t+ js=0t       R Mλ   (F3) 
and the ex ante present value of future marginal products of capital as: 
 [ ]%t-1t t =  Eλ λ   (F4) 
Note that λ  is the sum of products of random variables, but we can simplify by linearizing %λ  
around + =t sR R  and + =t sM M , where R and M are the respective sample means. 
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∞ ∞≈ Σ Σ% -1 -1 j jj=0 t+ j j=0 t+ jt M(1  -  R   +  M(1  -  R    (   -  R )  +   (   -  M )) ) R MR Rλ (F5) 
We can then find observable counterparts to R and M by using linear combinations of 
economic variables. 
 ′t t = a  M Z   (F6) 
 ′t t = b  R Z   (F7) 
Suppose Z has an auto-regressive structure. For specificity, consider the example where 
there are two variables in Z and where all the variables in Z are measured as deviations from 
their sample means, 
 
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
1,t 1,t-1 1,t
2,t 2,t-1 2,t
a(L) b(L) vZ Z =  + 
c(L) d(L) vZ Z
.  (F8) 
Stacking the vectors defined in (F8),  
1, 1, 11 1
1, 1 1,
2, 2, 11 1
2, 1 2,
. . . . . .
. .1 0 . . 0 0 . . . 0
. .: :
0 . 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
. . . . . .
. .0 . . . 0 1 . . . 0
. .: :
0 . . . 0 0 . 0 1 0
−
− + −
−
− + −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥=⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
l l
l l
l l
l l
t t
t t
t t
t t
Z Za a b b
Z Z
Z Zc c d d
Z Z
1
2
0
.
0
0
.
0
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎥ ⎢ ⎥+⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
t
t
v
v
  (F9) 
In the empirical work, we set l =2.  Equation (F9) can be re-written in companion matrix form, 
 % % % tt t-1 =  + vZ AZ .  (F10) 
Under the assumption of rational expectations, the expectations can be represented as linear 
projections on variables in the information set, 
 ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ %j+1t-1 t+ j t-1  = aAE M Z ,  (F11) 
 ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ %j+1t-1 t+ j t-1  = bAE R Z . (F12) 
The infinite sums that constitute marginal Q can be calculated as follows, using the last term 
in the expression for marginal Q (equation (F5)) as an example: 
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1−tE ∞ ∞Σ Σ % %-1j j j+1j=0 t+ j j=0 t-1 t-1   =     = a(I - RA A )aAM Z ZR R  (F13) 
Evaluating all of the terms in (F5), we obtain the following equation for tλ : 
( ) ( )1 11 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) − −− − − −= − + − − + −% %t t tM R M R R b I RA AZ Ra I RA AZλ (F14) 
In our empirical work, the variables that enter Z are R, Sales/K, Cost/K, /I Yp p , and I/K.  R is 
a natural candidate. Under a variety of assumptions (including constant and non-constant 
returns to scale, fully competitive markets, and imperfect competition, Sales/K and Cost/K are 
components of the marginal product of capital. We follow Abel and Blanchard in including 
them as separate variables. The relative price ratio /I Yp p  is a component of Q. Finally, 
under some assumptions, I/K is a useful forecasting variable; if investment is determined by 
fundamentals, then I/K reflects the expected present value of future marginal products of 
capital.20 With the variables in Z in the order listed above, we can define the vectors a and b 
as follows, 
 
[0 1 1 0 0],= −a
 (F15) 
 [1 0 0 0 0].=b  (F16) 
G.  Empirical Bootstrap for the Overreaction Test 
The procedure described in this paragraph is carried out for each year. First, divide all firms 
into one-digit industries and size quintiles (by industry).21  Calculate the number of glamour 
firms in each industry-size cell.  Define the complement of the glamour portfolio (i.e., all firms 
not in the glamour portfolio).  From each industry-size cell, draw a random sample of firms 
from the complement of the glamour portfolio, with replacement, where the sample size is 
equal to the number of glamour firms in the cell. (We draw from the complement of the 
glamour portfolio to strip out potential misvaluation.) Denote the resulting portfolio as the 
simulated glamour portfolio. Calculate the impulse response of investment to a sales shock 
for the simulated glamour portfolio for horizons 1 through 40. Repeat the entire procedure 
1,000 times.  
The resulting distribution of the impulse response functions is the bootstrapped empirical 
distribution. The 95 % confidence band that is shown in Figure 1 is formed by plotting the 
97.5 % and 2.5 % points of the empirical distribution for each horizon.  
                                                     
20 This follows directly in models based on convex adjustment costs.  In models with fixed costs, irreversibility, or 
other nonconvexities, investment will still depend on the expected present value of future marginal products of capital 
over some range.  See Abel and Eberly (1994). 
21 Industry 0 (agriculture and forestry) is quite small, so we combine it with industry 1 (mining and construction), both 
here and in the empirical bootstrap for the marginal product of capital. 
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H.  Empirical Bootstrap for the Marginal Product of Capital 
The procedure described in this paragraph is carried out for each year. First, divide all firms 
into one-digit industries and size quintiles (by industry).  Calculate the number of glamour first 
entry firms in each industry-size cell. We define the glamour first entry portfolio for each year 
as the subset of the glamour portfolio that was not a part of the glamour portfolio in the 
previous year. Define the complement of the glamour portfolio (i.e., all firms not in the 
glamour portfolio).  From each industry-size cell, draw a random sample of firms from the 
complement of the glamour portfolio, with replacement, where the sample size is equal to the 
number of glamour first entry firms in the cell. Denote the resulting portfolio as the simulated 
glamour first entry portfolio. Calculate the mean marginal product of capital for the simulated 
glamour first entry portfolio for horizons -3 through 5. Repeat the entire procedure 1,000 
times.  
The resulting median marginal product of capital for horizons -3 through 5 is the basis for the 
bootstrapped fundamental impulse response function. (In plotting Figure 4, we normalize so 
that the glamour and bootstrapped fundamental impulse response functions coincide at t-1.) 
The 95 % confidence band that is shown in Figure 4 is formed by plotting the 97.5 % and 
2.5 % points of the resulting empirical distribution for each horizon.  
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11 Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Statistics for the Full Sample 
 
 N Mean 25 % 50 % 75 % Std Deviation 
Skew- 
ness Kurtosis 
I 97713 143.830 1.447 8.442 52.416 736.694 23.091 1196.679 
K 97713 5335.914 14.363 76.900 584.853 31250.133 20.146 769.693 
I/K 97713 0.161 0.042 0.104 0.203 0.191 2.789 10.583 
SG 97713 0.118 -0.048 0.056 0.201 0.348 2.872 15.177 
Sales/K 97713 3.903 0.808 2.308 4.868 5.063 2.930 11.363 
Cost/K 97713 3.644 0.754 2.155 4.544 4.758 2.972 11.789 
MPK 97713 0.167 0.054 0.105 0.198 0.206 5.127 63.312 
NSI 95826 20.910 0.000 0.224 4.034 160.839 41.249 2966.890 
Returns 63363 0.165 -0.236 0.052 0.365 0.831 9.023 210.090 
I is investment in millions of 1996 dollars. K is the replacement value of the capital stock in 
1996 dollars. SG is real sales growth. Sales/K is the ratio of real sales to K. Cost/K is the ratio 
of the real cost of goods sold to K.  MPK is the marginal product of capital.  NSI is new share 
issues, measured as the proceeds from equity issues in millions of 1996 dollars. Returns are 
nominal annual stock market returns. See the Appendix for details of variable definitions. 
 
Panel B: New Share Issues by Portfolio 
 Glamour Value Difference Test Statistic [p-value] 
Median 0.7534 0.0000 0.7534 91.15 [0.000] 
Aggregated 
(standard deviation) 
0.5556 
(0.3460) 
0.1194 
(0.0544) 
0.4362 
(0.2916) 
6.23 
[0.000] 
Scaled by investment spending. The test statistic for the difference in medians is a 
nonparametric test based on analysis of variance on ranks. Aggregated new share issues 
equal (sum of new share issues)/(sum of investment spending), where the sums are taken 
over a given portfolio in a particular year. The t-test statistics for the aggregated variable is 
therefore based on 25 annual observations for each portfolio (1980-2004). See the Appendix 
for details of variable definitions and portfolio construction.  
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Table 2 
Comparing Investment/Capital Ratios 
 
Mean of I/K Ratio Definition of  
Benchmark 
Portfolios 
 
N 
 
Glamour 
Portfolio 
Benchmark 
Portfolio 
Difference 
(Glamour vs. 
Benchmark) 
Test 
Statistic 
[p-value] 
Value 14961 0.299 0.121 0.178 66.85 [0.000] 
Comparable Firms 14961 0.299 0.205 0.094 36.32 [0.000] 
Marginal Q 5629 0.272 0.166 0.106 29.01 [0.000] 
 
The table presents mean investment/capital (I/K) ratios. N is the number of glamour 
observations (smaller for the marginal Q benchmark because the data are not available to 
calculate marginal Q for all glamour observations). The test statistic is a t-test of the equality 
of the mean of I/K for the glamour and benchmark portfolios. See the Appendix for details of 
variable definitions and portfolio construction.  
Table 3 
Fama-MacBeth Tests with “Overinvestment” 
 
Horizon ,O G
γ  
(standard error) 
Mean effect on returns of a 
one std. dev. increase in 
“overinvestment” 
2 year -0.2908 (0.1067) -0.0474 
3 year -0.2827 (0.1082) -0.0475 
4 year -0.3641 (0.1152) -0.0598 
5 year -0.3722 (0.1316) -0.0613 
 
The parameter ,O Gγ  is the coefficient on “overinvestment” for glamour firms in a Fama-
MacBeth regression of cumulative excess returns on the CAPM β  and the product of 
“overinvestment” (in the period of portfolio formation) and a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 for glamour portfolios. The horizon is defined such that the two-year horizon, e.g., refers 
to returns from the beginning of the first year after portfolio formation to the end of the second 
year after portfolio formation. See the section entitled “Returns” and the Data Appendix for 
details of the regression specification, variable definitions, and portfolio construction. 
  39
Table 4 
Fama-MacBeth Tests with IRP 
 
Horizon 
IRPγ  
(std. 
error) 
Mean effect on 
returns of a 
one std. dev. 
increase in IRP 
,IRP NGγ  
(std. error) 
Mean effect on 
returns of a one 
std. dev. 
increase in IRP 
,IRP Gγ  
(std. error) 
Mean effect on 
returns of a 
one std. dev. 
increase in IRP 
2 year -0.7188 
(0.1462) -0.1032 
-0.5000 
(0.1195) -0.0724 
0.5005 
(0.1333) 0.0760 
3 year -0.6946 
(0.1489) -0.1020 
-0.5183 
(0.1226) -0.0750 
0.5151 
(0.1344) 0.0845 
4 year -0.7245 
(0.1555) -0.1056 
-0.5297 
(0.1164) -0.0805 
0.5698 
(0.1569) 0.0803 
5 year -0.7260 
(0.1254) -0.1143 
-0.5154 
(0.1044) -0.0861 
0.5449 
(0.1593) 0.0845 
 
The parameter IRPγ  is the coefficient on IRP (investment relative to the past) in a Fama-
MacBeth regression of cumulative excess returns on the CAPM β  and IRP. The first column 
reports this coefficient for the full sample, the third column for glamour portfolios, and the fifth 
column for non-glamour portfolios. The horizon is defined such that the two-year horizon, e.g., 
refers to returns from the beginning of the first year after portfolio formation to the end of the 
second year after portfolio formation. See the section entitled “Returns” and the Data 
Appendix for details of the regression specification, variable definitions, and portfolio 
construction.  
Table 5 
Fama-MacBeth Tests with “Overinvestment” and IRP 
 
Horizon ,O G
γ  
(std. error) 
Mean effect on returns of 
a one std. dev. increase 
in “overinvestment” 
,IRP Gγ  
(std. error) 
Mean effect on returns of 
a one std. dev. increase 
in IRP 
2 year -0.6005 
(0.1949) 
-0.1074 
0.5695 
(0.1557) 
0.0895 
3 year -0.6925 
(0.1977) 
-0.1270 
0.6036 
(0.1621) 
0.1048 
4 year -0.6643 
(0.1779) 
-0.1103 
0.6108 
(0.1648) 
0.0876 
5 year -0.8020 
(0.2309) 
-0.1295 
0.6110 
(0.1755) 
0.1021 
 
The parameter ,O Gγ  is the coefficient on “overinvestment” for glamour firms and the 
parameter ,IRP Gγ  is the coefficient on IRP (investment relative to the past) for glamour firms in 
a Fama-MacBeth regression of cumulative excess returns on the CAPM β  and these two 
variables. The horizon is defined such that the two-year horizon, e.g., refers to returns from 
the beginning of the first year after portfolio formation to the end of the second year after 
portfolio formation. See the section entitled “Returns” and the Data Appendix for details of the 
regression specification, variable definitions, and portfolio construction. 
  40
Table 6 
 
Quantitative Estimates of the Effect of Misvaluation on Investment 
Generic Investment Specification 
 
 (1) (2) 
Misvaluation 
  
  
  
0.0032267 
(0.0000696) 
[46.34] 
0.0032630 
(0.0000696) 
[46.89] 
Output 
  
  
  
0.1057030 
(0.0018990) 
[55.66] 
0.1047200 
(0.0018967) 
[55.21] 
Relative Price of Investment Goods 
  
  
  
-0.1177810 
(0.0058704) 
[-20.06] 
-0.1175470 
(0.0058573) 
[-20.07] 
Interest rate 
  
  
  
-0.0015221 
(0.0010937) 
[-1.39] 
-0.0014470 
(0.0010912) 
[-1.33] 
Cash Flow 
  
  
  
 0.0101090 
(0.0005758) 
[17.56] 
Number of Observations 
Number of Firms 
R2 
67837 
9075 
0.4964 
67756 
9070 
0.4990 
 
Each cell shows the point estimate, standard error (in parenthesis), and t statistic (in 
brackets). Output, the relative price of investment goods, and the interest rate enter as lagged 
percentage changes. Cash flow is the ratio of cash flow to the capital stock. Misvaluation is 
the difference between stock market Q and marginal Q (both beginning of period), as defined 
in the text. The regressions include both fixed effects and year effects. See the Appendix for 
details of variable definitions.  
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Table 7 
 
Quantitative Estimates of the Effect of Misvaluation on Investment 
Neoclassical and Accelerator Specifications 
 
 Neoclassical Accelerator   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Misvaluation 
 
 
0.0026910 
(0.0000734) 
[36.69] 
0.0027009 
(0.0000735) 
[36.77] 
0.0027042 
(0.0000735) 
[36.80] 
0.0027142 
(0.0000736) 
[36.88] 
Output t 
  
  
0.1119690 
(0.0019341) 
[57.89] 
0.1098170 
(0.0019518) 
[56.26] 
0.1105660 
(0.0019303) 
[57.28] 
0.1083930 
(0.0019479) 
[55.65] 
Output t – 1 
  
  
0.0906170 
(0.0018870) 
[48.02] 
0.0903160 
(0.0018878) 
[47.84] 
0.0892470 
(0.0018836) 
[47.38] 
0.0889500 
(0.0018844) 
[47.20] 
Output t – 2 
  
  
0.0552560 
(0.0017941) 
[30.80] 
0.0552190 
(0.0017958) 
[30.75] 
0.0539810 
(0.0017917) 
[30.13] 
0.0539470 
(0.0017933) 
[30.08] 
Cost of Capital t 
  
  
-0.0120950 
(0.0011175) 
[-10.82] 
-0.0120150 
(0.0011173) 
[-10.75] 
  
Cost of Capital t – 1 
  
  
-0.0126630 
(0.0010992) 
[-11.52] 
-0.0126210 
(0.0010994) 
[-11.48] 
  
Cost of Capital t – 2 
  
  
-0.0093059 
(0.0010584) 
[-8.79] 
-0.0092945 
(0.0010582) 
[-8.78] 
  
Cash Flow 
  
  
 
0.0042408 
(0.0005727) 
[7.40] 
 
0.0042984 
(0.0005738) 
[7.49] 
Number of Observations 
Number of Firms 
R2 
60473 
8053 
0.5263 
60404 
8048 
0.5264 
60473 
8053 
0.5245 
60404 
8048 
0.5245 
 
Each cell shows the point estimate, standard error (in parenthesis), and t statistic (in 
brackets). Output and the cost of capital enter as percentage changes. Cash flow is the ratio 
of cash flow to the capital stock. Misvaluation is the difference between stock market Q and 
marginal Q (both beginning of period), as defined in the text. The regressions include both 
fixed effects and year effects. See the Appendix for details of variable definitions.  
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Table 8 
 
Quantitative Estimates of the Effect of Misvaluation on Investment 
Q Specification 
 
 (1) (2) 
Misvaluation 
 
 
 
0.0031106 
(0.0000698) 
[44.56] 
0.0031455 
(0.0000700) 
[44.94] 
Marginal Q 
  
  
  
0.0289500 
(0.0005085) 
[56.94] 
0.0280880 
(0.0005193) 
[54.09] 
Cash Flow 
  
  
  
 0.0046464 
(0.0005884) 
[7.90] 
Number of Observations 
Number of Firms  
R2 
67837 
9075 
0.4972 
67756 
9070 
0.4975 
 
Each cell shows the point estimate, standard error (in parenthesis), and t statistic (in 
brackets). Cash flow is the ratio of cash flow to the capital stock. Misvaluation is the difference 
between stock market Q and marginal Q (both beginning of period), as defined in the text. 
The regressions include both fixed effects and year effects. See the Appendix for details of 
variable definitions.  
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Figure 2 
Supply and Demand for Capital 
Fundamental Shock 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Supply and Demand for Capital 
Misvaluation Shock 
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